1.Criminals Militias and InsurgentsOrganized Crime in Iraq
Phil Williams
SSI Book Launch CLAI, George Washington University
August 26, 2009
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2.Introduction
Appreciation to SSI – Professor Douglas Lovelace and Dr. Steven Metz for the opportunity and support – encouraged an open academic approach
Collegiality of SSI colleagues and GSPIA
Thanks to the CLAI – Ray Marin
Thanks to Dr William Rosenau and Dr John Picarelli
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3.3
OVERVIEW
Quiz
The Rise of Organized Crime in Iraq
Dimensions of Organized Crime in Iraq
Criminal-Insurgent Cooperation
The Slippery Criminal Slope
Causes of Strategic Surprise in Iraq
Intelligence and Military Contingencies
4.Fill in the blanks
Organized crime in the “…” centers on drug trafficking and the related problem of gang violence and firearms use” (Janes)
Feature of “…” organized crime is involvement of individuals with a paramilitary background.
Younger criminals more violent
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5.Fill in the blanks
Organized crime in the Republic of Ireland centers on drug trafficking and the related problem of gang violence and firearms use”
Feature of Irish organized crime is involvement of individuals with a paramilitary background.
Younger criminals more violent
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6.Fill in the blanks (2)
Three kinds of criminal organizations operating in “…” have been identified as follows:
Hierarchical
Hermit crab like (front companies)
Networked organizations
“…” is facing a massive upsurge of organized crime as a result of economic liberalization, urbanization and a huge migrant population
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7.Fill in the blanks (2)
Three kinds of criminal organizations operating in China have been identified as follows:
Hierarchical
Hermit crab like (front companies)
Networked organizations
China is facing a massive upsurge of organized crime as a result of economic liberalization, urbanization and a huge migrant population
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8.Fill in the blanks (3)
Journal article in Europe-Asian Studies - The State Under Siege: The drug trade and organized crime in “…”
“Organized crime has the potential to severely damage the “…” state’s legitimacy both domestically and in the international arena.”
“Ties to drug trafficking are endemic in the state structures of “…”
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9.Fill in the blanks (3)
Journal article in Europe-Asian Studies - The State Under Siege: The drug trade and organized crime in Tajikistan
“Organized crime has the potential to severely damage the Tajik state’s legitimacy both domestically and in the international arena.”
“Ties to drug trafficking are endemic in the state structures of Tajikistan
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10.Fill in the blanks (4)
Organized crime in “……..” is characterized by:
Extensive use of kidnappings
Clashes among rival groups
Corruption in the oil industry
Bank robberies
Extortion
Heavily armed criminal organizations
Government military clashes with criminals
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11.Fill in the blanks (4)
Organized crime in “Mexico” is characterized by:
Extensive use of kidnappings
Clashes among rival groups
Corruption in the oil industry
Bank robberies
Extortion
Heavily armed criminal organizations
Government military clashes with criminals
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12.Fill in the blanks (5)
Organized crime in “…” is characterized by:
Extensive use of kidnappings
Clashes among rival groups
Corruption in the oil industry
Bank robberies
Extortion
Heavily armed criminal organizations
Government military clashes with criminals
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13.Fill in the blanks (5)
Organized crime in “Iraq” is characterized by:
Extensive use of kidnappings
Clashes among rival groups
Corruption in the oil industry
Bank robberies
Extortion
Heavily armed criminal organizations
Government military clashes with criminals
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14.Organized crime and corruption in Iraq are far from unique, they exist there in highly concentrated forms. - major impact on stability and reconstruction effort
Conflict and crime dynamics remain little understood but increasingly connected
Seen a variation on this in Afghanistan – substitute opium for oil
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15.Iraq – similarities
Parallels between Iraq and Albania – state collapse in 1997
Parallels with Russia
Parallels – Odessa and Basra
Parallels – Niger Delta and Basra
Overtones of organized crime in Chicago and gang warfare in Los Angeles
Particularly virulent form
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16.Rise of organized crime in Iraq
Often a characteristic of dictatorships but controlled by political elite
Saddam as the Godfather -becoming more brittle – Saddam used tribes
Circumvention of sanctions
Protocols for oil smuggling – Jordan, Syria, Egypt and Turkey – earned $10.99 billion
OFF program – kickbacks and surcharges
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17.Criminalizing impact of sanctions -Andreas
Developed collusive relations with smugglers
Elevated role of organized crime
Established regional criminal networks – transnational social capital
Expansion of underground economy (65%)
Power of state dominated organized crime
Then – state collapse
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18.Collapse of the state
Release of 100,000 prisoners by Saddam
Power vacuum created opportunity space for organized crime
Theft of copper from pylons
Coalition forces allowed looting – (British in Basra) contributed to culture of lawlessness.
UNODC report - Summer 2003 - prescient
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19.Anomie, Looting, and Lawlessness
Degeneration of norms/standards
Failure to stop the looting
a culture of lawlessness
Pervasive corruption
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20.High levels of unemployment
Limited opportunities in legal economy – people migrate to the illegal
Insurgents, AQI, and criminals operated in same space – overlap and intersect
Insurgency funding: FREs then charities and couriers to self-financing through crime.
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21.First Wave of Organized Crime in Iraq
In fact many activities seen as about terror or insurgency had more to do with organized crime
Major activities include
Eviction of Sunnis by Mahdi Army – financial
Kidnapping – extensive activity and targets
Oil Smuggling – some pipeline attacks designed to ensure tanker trucks operate
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22.Second Wave of Organized Crime in Iraq
All players in Iraq engaged in organized crime activities
Appropriation of criminal methods for political-military fundraising
Militias – Jaish-al-Mahdi
AQI – all sorts of criminal activity (Madrid)
Sunni Tribes – various opportunists
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25. Dimensions of Organized Crime in Iraq
3 major activities:
Theft diversion and Smuggling of Oil
Kidnapping
Extortion
Additional activities:
drug trafficking and bank robberies
antiquities, women, cars,
corruption schemes – close links between organized crime and political elites
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26.Theft Diversion and Smuggling of Oil and Refined Products
Built on sanctions-busting 3 dimensions
Crude oil production – official figures suggest that miss 100,000 to 300,000 barrels per day ($5-15 Million)
Theft and poor oversight at Bayji oil refinery
Imported products diverted and sold on black market or re-exported
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29.Fight for control in Basra over oil
Fadhila Party
Badr Organization
Mahdi Army
Fight for taxing of illegal oil revenues
Similar to some of resource wars in Africa
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31.Fuel truck staging at Habur border gate
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32.Fuel truck staging at Habur border gate
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33.Problem of gauges and instruments for measurement
Steal from pipelines – tapped
Internal black market in gasoline – higher than official prices – so Mahdi Army presence at lots of gas stations
Lots of smuggling from Basra
Reduced by Charge of the Knights
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34.Kidnapping
Ideal crime
Generate fear and highlight inability of government to provide security,
High financial payoff - Iraq
Sow dissension in Coalition
Sometimes crime dressed as politics
Philippine government
Kidnapping group video – increase ransom
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35.Kidnapping
Most economic kidnapping is about Iraqis
Started with:
Children of upper middle class
Merchants
Doctors
Professors
From outrageous demands to accept realistic payments (10%) - pragmatic
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39.High profile kidnapping of foreigners from April 2004 – some about message
Kidnapping gangs sold victims to jihadis
Profits were significant and beheadings were counter-productive
Kidnappings linked to assassinations - bodies dropped where picked up
Sometimes linked to stolen cars
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41.Kidnapping of foreigners in Iraq
Based on the Brookings Institution’s Iraq Index
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44.The Profits
Estimate of $140 Million from Iraqis
$45 million from France, Italy, Germany
Still difficulty of assessment – under-reported by Iraqis
US hostage office only concerned with its own citizens or Iraqis who are important to the Coalition
Allowed pervasive insecurity to continue
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45.Extortion
Extortion - based on territorial control
Gives insurgency the quality of Mafia in the strict sense (Gambetta/Varese/Hill) – the business of private protection – purely predatory to real protection
Taxing economic activity
Licit – cattle ranching
Illicit – smuggling
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46.Extortion
Target merchants and market stalls
Militias and criminal organizations control the roads - used this to extort contractors who inflate the prices charged to the US accordingly. Some goes to “insurgency”
Result is that US is supplying the money used by various factions.
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50.The Dominant Commodity
Violence and crime center on dominant commodity – 3 kinds of players
For profit criminals
Those with a cause
Corrupt government officials after rents
Drugs in Colombia and Afghanistan
Oil in Iraq
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52.Conditions for Criminal-Insurgent Cooperation
Natural affinity and common culture – Chechnya
Territorial co-location – common interest in limiting government and governance
Co-location in opportunity space
Kidnapping groups in Iraq sold to jihadi groups
Sometimes supply driven
Sometimes demand driven
Sometimes explicit often tacit
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53.When insurgencies engage in do it yourself organized crime more likely that they cooperate with criminal organizations
Market relationships – suppliers and customers
Insurgents need “criminal service providers”
Sometimes one-off transactions
Some simple exploitation, some symbiotic
Some tactical alliances
A few strategic alliances – stability in relationship
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54.The Slippery Criminal Slope
Loss of cohesion – disputes over division of resources
Loss of identity – back to Metz and the notion of spiritual and commercial insurgencies – relegation of the cause – Pentagon Gang
Loss of legitimacy – JAM members criminal activities in Sadr City
Opportunities for wedge-driving or coopting the insurgency – Burma and Anbar
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55.The paradoxical consequences of criminal activities for insurgencies – sustain and help perpetuate the insurgency but also danger of undermining it from within.
The problem of imposed external labels – insurgents and criminals have own reality, imperatives and logic which are internally driven rather than externally imposed – same person can a greedy criminal AND a committed insurgent
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56. Organized Crime in Iraq as Strategic Surprise
Criminal enterprises became a major spoiler
Insurgents, terrorists and militias appropriated criminal activities (car theft)
Not new – Russia in the 1990s – Fritz Ermarth argued that neither intelligence nor policy-makers appreciated crime and corruption problem
Mark Edmond Clark – Balkans as model
UNODC report - indifference and resistance
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57.Causes of Strategic Surprise
Grooved thinking and labeling – organized crime simply law enforcement not military problem
Poor use of analogies - organized crime in US seen as model – but more virulent in failed states
Dominance of strategic perspective – Iraq as proliferation challenge not Iraq as criminalized state – “criminalization consequences of sanctions” not fully appreciated
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58.Wishful thinking – regime change without pain - expand order to the periphery – (dominant trend might be the other way)
Ethnocentrism and corruption – western democracies are the anomaly – the state as the prize – politics is zero sum and patrimonial relationships are the norm
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59.Intelligence and Military Contingencies
Need organized crime impact statement – like old arms control impact statements
Team Assessment – areas specialists, criminal analysts and methodologists
Current state of organized crime
Future development of organized crime – impact of intervention
Potential points of leverage
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60.Need to fuse law enforcement and national security intelligence
Obstacles are real but growing military emphasis on rule of law is positive
Need creation of multi-agency intelligence task force on post-conflict with mutual learning process facilitated by personnel exchanges to encourage cross-fertilization
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