1.Export Control
Karla Niemi, SAFE-IP Export Control
July 19, 2018
Energy Facility Contractors Group
Safeguards & Security Working Group
2.Introduction to Export Controls and Strategic Dual-Use Goods
Los Alamos National Laboratory
3.What are Export Controls?
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Export Controls are designed to:
Protect the National Security of the United States.
Protect Foreign Policy.
US Export Controls are administered by multiple
agencies.
4.What’s The Threat?
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Regional Conflict
Proliferation of WMD
Terrorism
Political Instability
5.Nonproliferation Objective
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Prevent proliferation of items and technologies associated with:
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Nuclear
Chemical
Biological
Delivery Systems
Conventional Weapons
Munitions
Military Items
6.Proliferators Attack Export Control Weaknesses
Utilization of dual-use or uncontrolled commodities to obscure the actual use in a weapons program
False end use statements, connections to activities of concern
Supplier
Agent/
Broker
Intermediate
Consignees
End User
Diversion in transit and smuggling
Use of other enterprises and universities to acquire facilities, equipment, technology and training
Cover names and front companies – diversion to unknown ultimate end user
Agents of foreign procurement networks obtain goods, often with circuitous buying patterns, and ship without license
Disguises or falsifies the final recipient country and/or the end user
Exploit countries with ineffective export controls and other loopholes
Some suppliers willing to export illegally, out of ignorance, for economic reasons, or to provide clandestine assistance
Inaccurate or vague commodity descriptions complicate enforcement
Los Alamos National Laboratory
7.Current Trends are Intensifying Proliferation Threats
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Globalization
Increasing transshipment trade
Modernization
Technology advances and ease of intangible transfer of technology
WMD Brokering
Front companies, “offshore” procurement networks and black-market supply networks
Terrorism
Threat of development and use of WMD by sub-national groups
Secondary Proliferation
Proliferants are themselves now suppliers of WMD commodities and know-how.
8.What is an Export?
An export is a transfer of equipment, material, software, or technology (information) to a foreign national either inside or outside of the United States by any means
Los Alamos National Laboratory
9.Challenges of Controlling Technology
U.S. exporters must be aware that technology related to controlled commodities can be controlled to the same extent as the commodity
Technology is information necessary for the development, production, or use of a commodity. It can take the form of
Technical Data
e.g., technical reports, calculations, experimental results, engineering design data and specifications (drawings, diagrams, and blueprints), and operating manuals
Technical Assistance
e.g., transfer of working knowledge or “know how”, instruction, consulting
Exemptions
Information in the public domain or intended for public release
e.g., published literature, conference proceedings
Fundamental research
Basic and applied research where the resulting information is ordinarily published and shared broadly within the scientific community
Effective internal compliance programs incorporate procedures to protect technology
Los Alamos National Laboratory
10.Challenges of Controlling Technology
Los Alamos National Laboratory
11.U.S. Export Controls
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Military Goods
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)
Licensing Entity: Directorate of Defense Trade Controls – Department of State
Dual-Use Goods
Export Administration Regulations (EAR)
Licensing Entity: Bureau of Industry and Security – Department of Commerce
Nuclear Technology
Technology requiring license enumerated in Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 810)
Licensing Entity: Department of Energy
NSG Trigger List Items
Technology requiring license enumerated in Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 110.8, 110.9)
Licensing Entity: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
The U.S. Export Control System has its basis in Multilateral Export Control Regimes and their Lists
12.Dual Use vs Defense Article
Los Alamos National Laboratory
13.Weapons of Mass Destruction
Los Alamos National Laboratory
All of these require dual-use items
Nuclear Weapons
Chemical Weapons
Biological Weapons
Delivery Systems
14.Dual-Use Example: Induction and Metallurgical Melting and Casting Furnaces
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Nuclear Use
Melting, casting, and processing U and Pu parts
Heat treating maraging steel for gas centrifuge rotor assemblies
Nuclear-related metallurgical research
Non-WMD Use
Non-nuclear metallurgical research
Production of specialty steels (e.g., maraging steel) or superalloys for the aerospace industry
Melting and casting reactive metals such as titanium and zirconium
Jewelry-making
Semiconductor fabrication and coating
15.Dual-Use Example: Machine Tools
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Nuclear Use
Manufacturing nuclear explosive device components, U-enrichment components, molds and crucibles for casting U or Pu
Non-WMD Use
Virtually every type of national industry, e.g., aerospace, automotive, general appliance, electronic, power generating, defense
16.International regimes are a primary basis for U.S. export controls
Los Alamos National Laboratory
16
Multilateral Export Controls
16
Conventional arms & Dual-use goods
WMD nonproliferation
U.S. Export Controls
AG: Australia Group
NSG: Nuclear Suppliers Group
MTCR: Missile Technology Control Regime
WA: Wassenaar Arrangement
OFAC: Office of Foreign Assets and Control
DOC: Department of Commerce
DOS: Department of State
DOE: Department of Energy
NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
17.It’s Complicated!
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Export Compliance
DOC
AGR
OFAC
EPA
NRC
ATF
DOS
FDA
DOE
DEA
Agricultural Items
Sanctions &
Embargoes
Environmental
Nuclear Commodities
DOD
Advisory Role
Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms
Military
Food and Drugs
Nuclear Tech.
Drug Enforcement
Dual-use
18.Proliferation Case Studies
Los Alamos National Laboratory
19.A.Q. Khan – A Special Problem Secondary Proliferation and Networks
Los Alamos National Laboratory
On February 2, 2004, A.Q. Khan, father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb, confessed in a televised address to transferring nuclear technology to North Korea, Iran, and Libya .
The IAEA describes the activities of Khan and the sophisticated network of black marketers associated with him as "the most serious case of nuclear proliferation in recent times."
Source: The Independent, “Scandal of Pakistani nuclear secrets for sale was ‘tip of iceberg’” (4 February 2004); http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/scandal-of-pakistani-nuclear-secrets-for-sale-was-tip-of-iceberg-568981.html
20.North Korea and Libya: Proliferation of Missile Development Capability
Indian customs agents boarded the Kuwolsan
Crates marked “water refinement equipment” contained nose cones, machine tools, guidance systems, extensive engineering drawings labeled “Scud B” and “Scud C.”
“In the past we had seen missile or engine parts, but here was an entire assembly line for missiles offered for sale. This was a complete technology transfer”
India government official
Smugglers’ Route: North Korean ship carried secret cargo of missile parts originally intended for Libya
Source: Washington Post, “On North Korean Freighter, a Hidden Missile Factory” (14 August 2003); http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A56111-2003Aug13?language=printer
Los Alamos National Laboratory
21.Recent Chemical Activity
April 2015: ISIS Carries Out Chemical Weapon Attack on Syrian Army
Possibly Mustard Gas
Nov 2015: ISIS is pursuing use of chemical weapons with the help of scientists
Chlorine, Mustard
Nov 2016: UN reports use of chemical weapons by Daesh as Iraqi troops inch ahead
Ammonia and Sulfur (Fumes from al-Mishrag Sulphur Gas Factory)
April 2017: U.S./Turkey Complicit in the Use of Chemical Weapons by Daesh and “Moderate Rebels” in Syria and Iraq
Initially Chlorine, possibly sarin or mustard gas
Los Alamos National Laboratory
22.Recent Biological Activity
Aug 2016: ISIS Anthrax Arrests Could Signal America’s Worst Nightmare Is Coming True
Mar 2016: Morocco: Arrested militants planned ‘biological’ attacks
2014-2016: Ebola Outbreak in West Africa
Feb 2017: North Georgia white supremacist indicted for possessing deadly ricin
Los Alamos National Laboratory
23.Recent Nuclear Activity
June 2015: Turkey: Men arrested carrying nuclear material at border
Smuggling 1.2 kilos of cesium
Oct 2015: Smugglers Tried to Sell Nuclear Material to ISIS (Moldova)
Smuggle and sell cesium
Sept 2016: Nuclear secrets: The ex-Westinghouse employee accused of helping a foreign power
Nuclear Technology
2017: Rise in Armenians Arrested for Nuclear-Materials Smuggling Is Worrisome
Selling Uranium 238
Uranium
Alan Ho
Los Alamos National Laboratory
24.Recent Missile Activity
Mar 2016: CEO allegedly shipped materials for missile production, nuclear applications to Iran
Aerospace-grade cobalt-nickel metallic powder
Apr 2016: Second Chinese Spy Case In a Week: Tried Exporting Materials for China Missile Program
Sensitive carbon fiber
Oct 2016: US foiled an alleged plot to illegally send missile technology to Russia
Sensitive electronics
Mar 2017: Another Iran Regime's Missile Technology Smuggler Arrested
Missile guidance testing equipment
Chinese DF-26
Iranian Rocket Shipment Seized by Israeli Navy (AP,2014)
Los Alamos National Laboratory
25.Case Study: Unintentional Export of Information
Event
2009: Georgia Institute of Technology offered an unclassified, non-credit, continuing education course on infrared systems and technology development for U.S. citizen employees of the U.S. government and U.S. companies. A training video of the course was inadvertently placed on the web where it was accessed from foreign IP addresses
Impact
Unknown, but when the Institute discovered the problem they filed a voluntary self-disclosure and ran extensive and costly tracking and remediation
Specifics
Some slides may have contained export controlled information
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Lessons Learned:
Ensure policies and procedures are in place and followed to ensure documents are reviewed for Export Controlled information prior to making public
26.LANL Self Disclosure Case Study
DOE’s Office of Science’s Atmospheric Radiation Measurement (ARM) Climate Research Facility
Mission: “To advance a robust predictive understanding of Earth’s climate and environmental systems and to inform the development of sustainable solutions to the Nation’s energy and environmental challenges”.
What: mobile weather instrument platforms deployed world wide to study radiative heat transfer, aerosol processes, and cloud processes in climate sensitive locations.
Los Alamos National Laboratory
27.Export Control Internal Compliance Program at LANL
Los Alamos National Laboratory
28.Managing Export Compliance at Los Alamos National Laboratory:Internal Compliance Program
Los Alamos National Laboratory
LANL’s Internal Compliance Program (ICP) is to ensure
institutional compliance with Federal export control
regulations in support of LANL's mission and programs
with foreign involvement.
A key component of LANL’s ICP is the Export Working Group (EWG), an advisory group that assists LANL management with export/import policy and implementation.
The EWG consists of LANL organizations with export control responsibilities and expertise
Export Control Team (primary ICP implementer)
Foreign Visits & Assignments
Legal Counsel
Technology Transfer (contracts and lab partnerships)
High Risk Property Management
International Nonproliferation
LANL’s ICP is proactive and involves all aspects of the laboratory and all level of employees
29.Managing Export Compliance at Los Alamos National Laboratory:Internal Compliance Program
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Functions of the LANL Export Control Team
Maintain and publish management policy and commitment;
Establish and Implement LANL’s ICP structure and procedures;
Support LANL’s Mission and International Activities;
Provide services, guidance, and resources for all export-related activities;
Provide training to the Laboratory;
Maintain complete documentation of all export transactions;
Provide mechanisms for employee reporting; address any corrective actions;
Perform comprehensive assessments of LANL ICP
Remain informed of updates to the government's export control laws and regulations to ensure compliance procedures are current
30.Summary
Export Controls are integral to combating the spread of WMD and their related technologies.
Export Controls are internationally mandated through treaties, agreements, etc., and implemented at the national level through state policy.
Proliferators continue to build WMD programs through illicit dual-use purchases by taking advantage of vulnerabilities in export control systems.
This has happened in the past (ex. AQ Khan) and continues to happen to this day.
Proliferators use clandestine brokering, procurement and supply networks.
Training, outreach and advisory groups are important to an Export Control ICP.
Export Controls are cross functional and everyone’s responsibility; we can all support each other and protect our national security by practicing awareness and due diligence.
Los Alamos National Laboratory