2018 July 19 Export Control Program - Karla Niemi

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  • 1.Export Control Karla Niemi, SAFE-IP Export Control July 19, 2018 Energy Facility Contractors Group Safeguards & Security Working Group
  • 2.Introduction to Export Controls and Strategic Dual-Use Goods Los Alamos National Laboratory
  • 3.What are Export Controls? Los Alamos National Laboratory Export Controls are designed to: Protect the National Security of the United States. Protect Foreign Policy. US Export Controls are administered by multiple agencies.
  • 4.What’s The Threat? Los Alamos National Laboratory Regional Conflict Proliferation of WMD Terrorism Political Instability
  • 5.Nonproliferation Objective Los Alamos National Laboratory Prevent proliferation of items and technologies associated with: Weapons of Mass Destruction Nuclear Chemical Biological Delivery Systems Conventional Weapons Munitions Military Items
  • 6.Proliferators Attack Export Control Weaknesses Utilization of dual-use or uncontrolled commodities to obscure the actual use in a weapons program False end use statements, connections to activities of concern Supplier Agent/ Broker Intermediate Consignees End User Diversion in transit and smuggling Use of other enterprises and universities to acquire facilities, equipment, technology and training Cover names and front companies – diversion to unknown ultimate end user Agents of foreign procurement networks obtain goods, often with circuitous buying patterns, and ship without license Disguises or falsifies the final recipient country and/or the end user Exploit countries with ineffective export controls and other loopholes Some suppliers willing to export illegally, out of ignorance, for economic reasons, or to provide clandestine assistance Inaccurate or vague commodity descriptions complicate enforcement Los Alamos National Laboratory
  • 7.Current Trends are Intensifying Proliferation Threats Los Alamos National Laboratory Globalization Increasing transshipment trade Modernization Technology advances and ease of intangible transfer of technology WMD Brokering Front companies, “offshore” procurement networks and black-market supply networks Terrorism Threat of development and use of WMD by sub-national groups Secondary Proliferation Proliferants are themselves now suppliers of WMD commodities and know-how.
  • 8.What is an Export? An export is a transfer of equipment, material, software, or technology (information) to a foreign national either inside or outside of the United States by any means Los Alamos National Laboratory
  • 9.Challenges of Controlling Technology U.S. exporters must be aware that technology related to controlled commodities can be controlled to the same extent as the commodity Technology is information necessary for the development, production, or use of a commodity. It can take the form of Technical Data e.g., technical reports, calculations, experimental results, engineering design data and specifications (drawings, diagrams, and blueprints), and operating manuals Technical Assistance e.g., transfer of working knowledge or “know how”, instruction, consulting Exemptions Information in the public domain or intended for public release e.g., published literature, conference proceedings Fundamental research Basic and applied research where the resulting information is ordinarily published and shared broadly within the scientific community Effective internal compliance programs incorporate procedures to protect technology Los Alamos National Laboratory
  • 10.Challenges of Controlling Technology Los Alamos National Laboratory
  • 11.U.S. Export Controls Los Alamos National Laboratory Military Goods International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) Licensing Entity: Directorate of Defense Trade Controls – Department of State Dual-Use Goods Export Administration Regulations (EAR) Licensing Entity: Bureau of Industry and Security – Department of Commerce Nuclear Technology Technology requiring license enumerated in Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 810) Licensing Entity: Department of Energy NSG Trigger List Items Technology requiring license enumerated in Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 110.8, 110.9) Licensing Entity: Nuclear Regulatory Commission The U.S. Export Control System has its basis in Multilateral Export Control Regimes and their Lists
  • 12.Dual Use vs Defense Article Los Alamos National Laboratory
  • 13.Weapons of Mass Destruction Los Alamos National Laboratory All of these require dual-use items Nuclear Weapons Chemical Weapons Biological Weapons Delivery Systems
  • 14.Dual-Use Example: Induction and Metallurgical Melting and Casting Furnaces Los Alamos National Laboratory Nuclear Use Melting, casting, and processing U and Pu parts Heat treating maraging steel for gas centrifuge rotor assemblies Nuclear-related metallurgical research Non-WMD Use Non-nuclear metallurgical research Production of specialty steels (e.g., maraging steel) or superalloys for the aerospace industry Melting and casting reactive metals such as titanium and zirconium Jewelry-making Semiconductor fabrication and coating
  • 15.Dual-Use Example: Machine Tools Los Alamos National Laboratory Nuclear Use Manufacturing nuclear explosive device components, U-enrichment components, molds and crucibles for casting U or Pu Non-WMD Use Virtually every type of national industry, e.g., aerospace, automotive, general appliance, electronic, power generating, defense
  • 16.International regimes are a primary basis for U.S. export controls Los Alamos National Laboratory 16 Multilateral Export Controls 16 Conventional arms & Dual-use goods WMD nonproliferation U.S. Export Controls AG: Australia Group NSG: Nuclear Suppliers Group MTCR: Missile Technology Control Regime WA: Wassenaar Arrangement OFAC: Office of Foreign Assets and Control DOC: Department of Commerce DOS: Department of State DOE: Department of Energy NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
  • 17.It’s Complicated! Los Alamos National Laboratory Export Compliance DOC AGR OFAC EPA NRC ATF DOS FDA DOE DEA Agricultural Items Sanctions & Embargoes Environmental Nuclear Commodities DOD Advisory Role Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms Military Food and Drugs Nuclear Tech. Drug Enforcement Dual-use
  • 18.Proliferation Case Studies Los Alamos National Laboratory
  • 19.A.Q. Khan – A Special Problem Secondary Proliferation and Networks Los Alamos National Laboratory On February 2, 2004, A.Q. Khan, father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb, confessed in a televised address to transferring nuclear technology to North Korea, Iran, and Libya . The IAEA describes the activities of Khan and the sophisticated network of black marketers associated with him as "the most serious case of nuclear proliferation in recent times." Source: The Independent, “Scandal of Pakistani nuclear secrets for sale was ‘tip of iceberg’” (4 February 2004); http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/scandal-of-pakistani-nuclear-secrets-for-sale-was-tip-of-iceberg-568981.html
  • 20.North Korea and Libya: Proliferation of Missile Development Capability Indian customs agents boarded the Kuwolsan Crates marked “water refinement equipment” contained nose cones, machine tools, guidance systems, extensive engineering drawings labeled “Scud B” and “Scud C.” “In the past we had seen missile or engine parts, but here was an entire assembly line for missiles offered for sale. This was a complete technology transfer” India government official Smugglers’ Route: North Korean ship carried secret cargo of missile parts originally intended for Libya Source: Washington Post, “On North Korean Freighter, a Hidden Missile Factory” (14 August 2003); http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A56111-2003Aug13?language=printer Los Alamos National Laboratory
  • 21.Recent Chemical Activity April 2015: ISIS Carries Out Chemical Weapon Attack on Syrian Army Possibly Mustard Gas Nov 2015: ISIS is pursuing use of chemical weapons with the help of scientists Chlorine, Mustard Nov 2016: UN reports use of chemical weapons by Daesh as Iraqi troops inch ahead Ammonia and Sulfur (Fumes from al-Mishrag Sulphur Gas Factory) April 2017: U.S./Turkey Complicit in the Use of Chemical Weapons by Daesh and “Moderate Rebels” in Syria and Iraq Initially Chlorine, possibly sarin or mustard gas Los Alamos National Laboratory
  • 22.Recent Biological Activity Aug 2016: ISIS Anthrax Arrests Could Signal America’s Worst Nightmare Is Coming True Mar 2016: Morocco: Arrested militants planned ‘biological’ attacks 2014-2016: Ebola Outbreak in West Africa Feb 2017: North Georgia white supremacist indicted for possessing deadly ricin Los Alamos National Laboratory
  • 23.Recent Nuclear Activity June 2015: Turkey: Men arrested carrying nuclear material at border Smuggling 1.2 kilos of cesium Oct 2015: Smugglers Tried to Sell Nuclear Material to ISIS (Moldova) Smuggle and sell cesium Sept 2016: Nuclear secrets: The ex-Westinghouse employee accused of helping a foreign power Nuclear Technology 2017: Rise in Armenians Arrested for Nuclear-Materials Smuggling Is Worrisome Selling Uranium 238 Uranium Alan Ho Los Alamos National Laboratory
  • 24.Recent Missile Activity Mar 2016: CEO allegedly shipped materials for missile production, nuclear applications to Iran Aerospace-grade cobalt-nickel metallic powder Apr 2016: Second Chinese Spy Case In a Week: Tried Exporting Materials for China Missile Program Sensitive carbon fiber Oct 2016: US foiled an alleged plot to illegally send missile technology to Russia  Sensitive electronics  Mar 2017: Another Iran Regime's Missile Technology Smuggler Arrested Missile guidance testing equipment Chinese DF-26 Iranian Rocket Shipment Seized by Israeli Navy (AP,2014) Los Alamos National Laboratory
  • 25.Case Study: Unintentional Export of Information Event 2009: Georgia Institute of Technology offered an unclassified, non-credit, continuing education course on infrared systems and technology development for U.S. citizen employees of the U.S. government and U.S. companies. A training video of the course was inadvertently placed on the web where it was accessed from foreign IP addresses Impact Unknown, but when the Institute discovered the problem they filed a voluntary self-disclosure and ran extensive and costly tracking and remediation Specifics Some slides may have contained export controlled information Los Alamos National Laboratory Lessons Learned: Ensure policies and procedures are in place and followed to ensure documents are reviewed for Export Controlled information prior to making public
  • 26.LANL Self Disclosure Case Study DOE’s Office of Science’s Atmospheric Radiation Measurement (ARM) Climate Research Facility Mission: “To advance a robust predictive understanding of Earth’s climate and environmental systems and to inform the development of sustainable solutions to the Nation’s energy and environmental challenges”. What: mobile weather instrument platforms deployed world wide to study radiative heat transfer, aerosol processes, and cloud processes in climate sensitive locations. Los Alamos National Laboratory
  • 27.Export Control Internal Compliance Program at LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory
  • 28.Managing Export Compliance at Los Alamos National Laboratory:Internal Compliance Program Los Alamos National Laboratory LANL’s Internal Compliance Program (ICP) is to ensure institutional compliance with Federal export control regulations in support of LANL's mission and programs with foreign involvement. A key component of LANL’s ICP is the Export Working Group (EWG), an advisory group that assists LANL management with export/import policy and implementation. The EWG consists of LANL organizations with export control responsibilities and expertise Export Control Team (primary ICP implementer) Foreign Visits & Assignments Legal Counsel Technology Transfer (contracts and lab partnerships) High Risk Property Management International Nonproliferation LANL’s ICP is proactive and involves all aspects of the laboratory and all level of employees
  • 29.Managing Export Compliance at Los Alamos National Laboratory:Internal Compliance Program Los Alamos National Laboratory Functions of the LANL Export Control Team Maintain and publish management policy and commitment; Establish and Implement LANL’s ICP structure and procedures; Support LANL’s Mission and International Activities; Provide services, guidance, and resources for all export-related activities; Provide training to the Laboratory; Maintain complete documentation of all export transactions; Provide mechanisms for employee reporting; address any corrective actions; Perform comprehensive assessments of LANL ICP Remain informed of updates to the government's export control laws and regulations to ensure compliance procedures are current
  • 30.Summary Export Controls are integral to combating the spread of WMD and their related technologies. Export Controls are internationally mandated through treaties, agreements, etc., and implemented at the national level through state policy. Proliferators continue to build WMD programs through illicit dual-use purchases by taking advantage of vulnerabilities in export control systems. This has happened in the past (ex. AQ Khan) and continues to happen to this day. Proliferators use clandestine brokering, procurement and supply networks. Training, outreach and advisory groups are important to an Export Control ICP. Export Controls are cross functional and everyone’s responsibility; we can all support each other and protect our national security by practicing awareness and due diligence. Los Alamos National Laboratory
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