1.Optimal Online Contention Resolution SchemesVIA Ex-Ante Prophet Inequalities
Sahil Singla
(Carnegie Mellon University ➞ Princeton University)
Joint Work with euiwoong Lee
(22nd August, 2018)
2.Online Rounding AlgorithmsUSING Prophet Inequalities
Sahil Singla
(Carnegie Mellon University ➞ Princeton University)
Joint Work with euiwoong Lee
(22nd August, 2018)
3.Diamond-Selling Problem
Sell One Diamond: Multiple potential buyers
Buyers Arrive and Make a Take-it-or-Leave-it Bid
Decide Immediately and Irrevocably
Goal:
Maximize value of the accepted bid
Cannot go back to a declined bid
Similar Examples
Selling ad-slots
Finding a secretary/marriage partner
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4.Prophet Inequality Model
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Given Indep Distributions on Values 𝑋 1 , 𝑋 2 , .. , 𝑋 𝑛
Irrevocably decide if picking: Known adversarial order
Objective:
Maximize value of picked buyer 𝐄[𝐀𝐥𝐠]
Compare to 𝐄[𝐌𝐚𝐱], i.e., 𝐄[𝐀𝐥𝐠] 𝐄[𝐌𝐚𝐱]
X3=0.2
X2=0.6
X1=0.3
X1~Unif(0,1)
X2~Exp(2)
X3∼0.2
X4=0.9
Picked
X4~Unif(0,1)
Cannot Beat ½-Approx
Let 𝑋 1 =1 w.p. 1
Let 𝑋 2 = 1 𝜖 w.p. 𝜖 0 otherwise
𝐄[𝐌𝐚𝐱] =𝜖⋅ 1 𝜖 + 1−𝜖 ⋅1≈2
𝐄[𝐀𝐥𝐠 ] ≤1
𝑿 𝒊 = 𝒗 𝒊 w.p. 𝒑 𝒊 𝟎 otherwise
Krengel-Sucheston’77 gave 1 2 -approx
5.PROOF: Pr i considered = Pr Reach i ⋅Pr i considered| reach i
≥ Pr Reach n ⋅ 1 2 ≥ 1 4
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Lemma: 𝐄[𝐌𝐚𝐱] is at most ex-ante relaxation
max: 𝑖 𝑦 𝑖 ⋅ v 𝑖
s.t. 𝑖 𝑦 𝑖 ≤1
𝑦 𝑖 ∈[0, 𝑝 𝑖 ]
Suffices: Any algorithm that picks every i w.p. 𝑦 𝑖 2 while 𝑋 𝑖 = v 𝑖
At most 1 item
Probability i is max
1 2 -OCRS (Magician’s problem Alaei’11)
because, implies 𝐄 𝐀𝐥𝐠 ≥ 1 2 ⋅ 𝑖 𝑦 𝑖 ⋅ v 𝑖 ⟹ 1 2 -prophet inequality
Thm ( 1 4 -OCRS): Consider i w.p. 1 2 on reaching, and pick if 𝑋 𝑖 = v 𝑖 .
Prophet Ineq to OCRS
𝑿 𝒊 = 𝐯 𝒊 w.p. 𝒑 𝒊 𝟎 otherwise
WLOG 𝑦 𝑖 = 𝑝 𝑖
by reducing 𝑝 𝑖
≥(1− 1 2 ∑ 𝑦 𝑗 ) ≥ 1 2
6.6
Lemma: 𝐄[𝐌𝐚𝐱 𝐈𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐩 𝐒𝐞𝐭] is at most ex-ante relaxation
max: 𝑖 𝑦 𝑖 ⋅ v 𝑖
s.t. 𝐲∈Matroid Polytope
𝑦 𝑖 ∈[0, 𝑝 𝑖 ]
Probability i in offline max
Matroid Prophet Inequality
𝑿 𝒊 = 𝐯 𝒊 w.p. 𝒑 𝒊 𝟎 otherwise
Constraints = Matroid
Function = Additive
Given Indep Distributions on Values 𝑋 1 , 𝑋 2 , .. , 𝑋 𝑛
Irrevocably decide if picking: Known adversarial order
Goal: Maximize sum of values of Indep Set
Compare to 𝐄[𝐌𝐚𝐱 𝐈𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐩 𝐒𝐞𝐭] i.e., 𝐄[𝐀𝐥𝐠] 𝐄[𝐌𝐚𝐱 𝐈𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐩 𝐒𝐞𝐭]
𝛼-OCRS ⟹ 𝛼-Approx Ex-Ante Prophet Inequality
Compares to relaxation
instead of 𝐄[𝐌𝐚𝐱 𝐈𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐩 𝐒𝐞𝐭]
7.Given 𝒚∈ ℛ 𝑛 inside matroid polytope
Each element 𝑖 active independently w.p. 𝑦 𝑖 : Revealed one-by-one
Decide immediately and irrevocably to select current active 𝑖
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Online Contention Resolution Scheme
Defn (𝜶-OCRS): An online rounding algorithm that always remains feasible and ensures∀𝒊: 𝐏𝐫 𝒊 𝐢𝐬 𝐬𝐞𝐥𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐝 & 𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞 ≥𝜶⋅ 𝒚 𝒊
Introduced by Feldman-Svenson-Zenklusen’16:
Gave ¼-OCRS for matroids
Applications:
Stochastic problems with “commitment constraints”
Getting 1 2 -OCRS?
8.8
Our Main Results
Corollary: There Exists a 𝟏 𝟐 -OCRS for a Matroid
Thm 2: There Exists a 𝟏 𝟐 -Ex-Ante Prophet Inequality for a Matroid
Thm 1: 𝜶-Ex-Ante Proph-Ineq ⟹ 𝜶-OCRS
We can also design OCRSs from prophet inequalities.
9.Introduction
What is a Prophet Inequality and an OCRS
Why OCRS implies Prophet Inequality
Our Main Results
Why Ex-ante Prophet Inequality implies OCRS
CVZ Style LP for OCRS
Using LP Duality
How to Design Ex-ante Prophet Inequalities
Challenges
Proof Ideas
Conclusions
Extension to Random Order
Open Problems
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Outline
10.Introduction
What is a Prophet Inequality and an OCRS
Why OCRS implies Prophet Inequality
Our Main Results
Why Ex-ante Prophet Inequality implies OCRS
CVZ Style LP for OCRS
Using LP Duality
How to Design Ex-ante Prophet Inequalities
Challenges
Proof Ideas
Conclusions
Extension to Random Order
Open Problems
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Outline
11.11
Let 𝜙∈Φ denote deterministic online rounding scheme
Let 𝑞 𝑖,𝜙 =Pr[𝑖 selected by 𝜙] and 𝜆 𝜙 =Pr[ϕ is running]
𝐦𝐚 𝐱 𝝀,𝑐 : 𝑐
s.t. ∀𝑖: 𝜙 𝑞 𝑖,𝜙 𝜆 𝜙 ≥ 𝑦 𝑖 ⋅𝑐
𝜙 𝜆 𝜙 =1
∀𝜙: 𝜆 𝜙 ≥0
CVZ Style LP for OCRS
Thm 1: 𝜶-Ex-Ante Proph-Ineq ⟹ 𝜶-OCRS
CVZ style exponential sized LP:
c-selectability
Valid distribution over Φ
Suffices to show LP value = Dual LP value ≥𝛼
because implies 𝛼-OCRS
13.Introduction
What is a Prophet Inequality and an OCRS
Why OCRS implies Prophet Inequality
Our Main Results
Why Ex-Ante Prophet Inequality implies OCRS
CVZ Style LP for OCRS
Using LP Duality
How to Design Ex-Ante Prophet Inequalities
Challenges
Proof Ideas
Conclusions
Extension to Random Order
Open Problems
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Outline
14.Challenges
Standard proph-ineq compares to 𝐄[𝐌𝐚𝐱 𝐈𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐩 𝐒𝐞𝐭]
Ex-ante proph-ineq compares to 𝑖 𝑦 𝑖 𝑣 𝑖
In general 1− 1 𝑒 ⋅ Ex-Ante Relax ≤ 𝐄[𝐌𝐚𝐱 𝐈𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐩 𝐒𝐞𝐭] ≤ Ex-Ante Relax
Implies a 1 2 ⋅ 1− 1 𝑒 ex-ante prophet inequality
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THM [KW’12]: There Exists 𝟏 𝟐 -Matroid Prophet Inequality
Correlation Gap
Thm 2: There Exists a 𝟏 𝟐 -Ex-Ante Prophet Inequality for a Matroid
15.Proof Ideas
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Find probability distribution 𝓓 over independent sets s.t.𝒚= 𝑆 is Independent 𝓓 𝑆 ⋅ 𝟏 𝑆
Ex-ante objective is 𝑖 𝑦 𝑖 𝑣 𝑖 = 𝑆 is Independent 𝓓 𝑆 ⋅ 𝑖∈𝑆 𝑣 𝑖
Modify KW’12 to compare to correlated distrib 𝓓 instead of product distrib
Corollary: There Exists a 𝟏 𝟐 -OCRS for a Matroid
Thm 2: There Exists a 𝟏 𝟐 -Ex-Ante Prophet Inequality for a Matroid
16.Introduction
What is a Prophet Inequality and an OCRS
Why OCRS implies Prophet Inequality
Our Main Results
Why Ex-ante Prophet Inequality implies OCRS
CVZ Style LP for OCRS
Using LP Duality
How to Design Ex-ante Prophet Inequalities
Challenges
Proof Ideas
Conclusions
Extension to Random Order
Open Problems
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Outline
17.Optimal RCRS
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THM [EHKS’18]: There exists (1− 𝟏 𝒆 )-Prophet-Secretary for
Constraints = Matroid
Function = Additive
Proof uses Two Ideas
Exponential LP with variables all deterministic online algorithms
Show dual is at least (1− 𝟏 𝒆 ), which is an ex-ante prophet-secretary inequality
QUES: Better than 𝟏 𝟐 -OCRS for uniformly random arrival?
THM 3: There exists a (1− 𝟏 𝒆 )-RCRS for a Matroid
18.
Connections between OCRS and Prophet Inequalities
OCRS ⟹ Prophet Ineq
Ex-ante Prophet Ineq ⟹ OCRS
Designing Ex-Ante Prophet Inequalities
1 2 -approx for adversarial order over a matroid
1− 1 𝑒 -approx for random order over a matroid
Open Questions
Can we avoid assuming adversarial order is known?
Can we get “greedy” OCRSs that are useful for submodular functions?
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Questions?
Summary and Open Problems
19.References
S. Alaei. `Bayesian combinatorial auctions: Expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers’. FOCS’11
C. Chekuri, J. Vondrak, and R. Zenklusen. `Submodular function maximization via the multilinear relaxation and contention resolution schemes’. SICOMP’14.
S. Ehsani, T. Kesselheim, M.T. Hajiaghayi, and S. Singla. `Prophet Secretary for Matroids and Combinatorial Auctions’. SODA’18.
M. Feldman, O. Svensson, and R. Zenklusen. `Online contention resolution schemes’. SODA’16
R.D. Kleinberg and M. Weinberg. `Matroid prophet inequalities’. STOC’12
U. Krengel and L. Sucheston. `Semiamarts and finite values’. Bull. Amer. Math. Soc.’77
E. Lee and S. Singla. `Optimal Online Contention Resolution Schemes via Ex-Ante Prophet Inequalities'. ESA’18.
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